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During the XXI century, South America has been the epicenter of vibrant discussions
on human mobility. A new vocabulary emerged with legal principles such as the
non-criminalization of irregular migration or the right to migrate as a fundamental right
taking central stage. The combination of the arrival of COVID-19 together with the
important emigration of Venezuelans in the region, as well as economic and political
crisis are putting into question some of these advances and present a complex scenario
of migration governance in the region for the years to come.
Keywords: South America, MERCOSUR residence agreement, venezuelan emigration, COVID – 19, irregular
migration

INTRODUCTION
In the XXI century, South America adopted distinctive policies and vocabulary in the area of
migration. This approach emphasized migrants’ rights, the non-criminalization of migration and
the “right to migrate” in fora such as the South American Conference on Migration. However, the
arrival of Covid-19 coincided with a very delicate moment in which most of the region was already
experiencing an economic, political and social crisis and where the emigration of circa five million
Venezuelans, mostly to other countries in South America, had dramatically altered the migration
picture in the region.
The objective of this article is to explain how the political and legal responses to the Covid-19
crisis in South America in the first semester of 2020 have affected human mobility. We position
these political and legal responses within a wider context of a multidimensional crisis, and we
propose possible future political and legal developments. The sources for this article are national
and regional legislation, statistics for migration and mobility, and specialized literature. This also
builds from the authors’ previous work on South American migration governance (Acosta and
Freier, 2015; Brumat and Acosta, 2019; Brumat, 2020a; Acosta, 2018).
This article is divided into three parts. In the first one, we describe the general context in the
region before Covid-19 arrived: we address the policies and legislation that were developed in
the early XXI century, as well as the political, social and economic crisis that ensued since 2015.
We particularly focus on the Venezuelan emigration as a destabilizing factor. The second part
addresses the political and legal responses to the Covid-19 crisis as well as their legal and political
consequences and effects on mobility. Taking all these factors into account, the third part proposes
three possible scenarios for the future.
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SOUTH AMERICA BEFORE COVID-19

by 65%, while poverty was reduced by 40% (ECLAC, 2019b,
p. 29). Economic expansion and social policies enhanced the
popularity of the so-called “pink tide” governments. By 2015
though, increased commodity price volatility led to an economic
slowdown particularly affecting its three largest powerhouses:
Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela (ECLAC, 2016, 2019a).
With the economy worsening in 2015, it became clear that the
social policies of the early 2000s had not been sufficient to reverse
the inequalities characterizing the region. Partly as a consequence
of this, center-right and right-wing politicians returned to power.
This included Macri in Argentina (2015), Temer in Brazil (2016,
following the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff) or Piñera in Chile
(2018) and heralded a shift in the economic and social policies in
the region. The “turn to the right” was completed with the arrival
to Brazil’s presidency in January 2019 of Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right
politician and a vociferous opponent of migrants’ rights. Chile
rejected the adoption of the Global Compact on Migration while
Brazil withdrew from it right after Bolsonaro took office.
Venezuela deserves further attention. Since 2014, the country
is undergoing a profound social, political and economic crisis
with rampant inflation (IMF, 2020), severe food and health
insecurity (FAO, 2019) and increased criminality having the
second highest murder rate in the world (WB, 2020). This
extreme situation has sparked mass protests since 2018 and
prompted the largest forced displacement in Latin American
history with 4.5 million Venezuelans emigrating between 2015
and early 2020 (UNHCR IOM, 2020). This was unprecedented
since Venezuela had never been an origin country but rather a
destination one.
Most of the 5.2 million Venezuelans residing abroad in
early 2020 did so in other South American states—notably
Colombia, Peru, Chile, Ecuador, Brazil and Argentina, in
that order. Legal and political responses to the arrival of
Venezuelans have been mostly adopted at the national level,
and regional cooperation on the issue has been scarce, with
the exception of the Quito Process—an ad hoc meeting of
governments in the region adopting non-binding declarations
about Venezuelan emigration (Acosta et al., 2019; Brumat,
2020b). These responses can be categorized into five groups
with some countries falling into more than one of them.
Firstly, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Uruguay have extended
regional free movement provisions to incorporate Venezuelans
thus offering them a right of residence. Particularly in the
Ecuadorian case, the requirements to access a temporary permit
were difficult to meet and left many in an irregular situation.
Thus, a second response has been to launch regularization
processes in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and more recently in
October 2020 in Peru. A third legal tool, mostly used by Brazil—
and to a much lesser extent by Bolivia and Paraguay—has
been to recognize Venezuelans as refugees under the extended
definition enshrined in the Cartagena declaration (Acosta and
Sartoretto, 2020). Fourthly, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and
Peru introduced special temporary residence permits, with
Colombia offering a new round of such permits in October
2020. Finally, and particularly as the situation aggravated, Chile,
Ecuador and Peru decided to introduce visa requirements
for Venezuelans, a step that had been first taken outside

During the XXI century, South America has been the epicenter
of vibrant discussions on human mobility1 . A new vocabulary
emerged with legal principles such as the non-criminalization
of irregular migration or the right to migrate as a fundamental
right taking central stage in fora such as the South American
Conference on Migration—a regional consultative process
involving all countries in the region and adopting yearly nonlegally binding declarations (Acosta, 2018). These animated
debates were facilitated by the fact that most countries in the
region had large numbers of emigrants, particularly in the
United States and Spain, coupled with center-left governments
that presented the protection of the rights of their nationals
abroad as a central aspect of their international agenda (Acosta
and Freier, 2018). Whilst South America had been the second
largest recipient of newcomers, after the USA, during the great
European migrations taking place between the 1870s and 1930,
non-national populations at home were statistically insignificant
in comparative global terms at the dawn of the new century 2 .
This new vocabulary also found its way into laws. The
MERCOSUR Residence Agreement revolutionized mobility in
South America. Implemented in 2009, the Agreement provides
that any national of a MERCOSUR or Associate Member State
may reside and work, as well as access other rights, for a period
of 2 years in a host State. After 2 years, the temporary residence
permit may be transformed into a permanent one if the person
proves legitimate means of living for himself or herself and any
family members. All countries in South America (i.e., not just
MERCOSUR countries) have ratified the agreement and apply
it with the exception of Venezuela, Surinam and Guyana 3 . By
2016, 2.7 million residence permits had been granted under the
agreement in the countries implementing it (IOM, 2018). In the
first years of the XXI century, migration became an issue that
reinforced South American regionalism (Margheritis, 2013).
By the time COVID-19 hit South America in 2020, this
general and sketchy picture had been subject to various political,
economic and mobility pressures since at least 2015. These
pressures aroused from what seemed to be an improvement
of the social and economic situation in the first decade and
a half of the XXI century. During that period, South America
experienced sustained economic growth, facilitated by increasing
international prices of commodities, its main exports (ECLAC,
2009, 2013). This growth allowed for a reduction in income
inequality and extreme poverty as well as the inclusion of vast
sectors of the society into the formal workforce. Between 2002–
2017, the middle income population in Latin America increased
1 South

America in this paper refers to ten countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Due to their
different historical and colonial past, and to their lower participation in regional
integration processes, Guyana and Surinam are no incorporated in this analysis.
2 By 2015, the 10 countries in the region had 5.6 million non-nationals representing
1.3% of the total population. By contrast, they had more than 10.8 million
emigrants, amounting to 2.6% of the total population (Acosta, 2018, p. 14).
3 Chile has not ratified it with a national law. It applies it to nationals of Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay through an administrative regulation
“Oficio Circular 26456” of 2009. See IOM (2018).
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relatively successful regional policies and cooperation in the area
of health (Riggirozzi, 2020), means that that there is no common
institutional framework with policy expertise to adopt shared
responses to the health crisis.
In principle, national responses have been constrained by
international law. The American Convention on Human Rights
is the most important instrument at regional level overseeing
the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms (American
Convention on Human Rights, 1969). The duo Inter-American
Commission and Inter-American Court of Human Rights are
responsible for supervising its compliance. Whilst state parties
might suspend some of its guarantees in times of emergency,
they need to inform, in accordance with article 27 of the
American Convention, the Secretary General of the Organization
of American States. Emergency powers have a long tradition in
South America and have been unacceptably abused since the XIX
century (Negretto and Aguilar Rivera, 1999). This is the result
of several factors such as the prominent powers of Executives
and that others have debated (Gargarella, 2013). During the last
three decades though, emergency powers had only been sparely
used during. With the arrival of COVID-19, all South American
countries – with the exception of Brazil, Guyana and Uruguay—
have availed themselves of a possibility that, even if affecting
the entire population, might have a larger impact on vulnerable
groups (OAS, 2020).
Undocumented migrants have been particularly distressed
by COVID-19. In countries such as Colombia, Ecuador and
Peru, the number of migrants in an irregular situation has
skyrocketed with the arrival of Venezuelans. For example in
Peru, the mechanisms for obtaining residence were suspended
in 2018 and the introduction of visa requirements the year after
led to an increase in the number of irregular entries (Freier
and Parent, 2019a). In Colombia, despite the adoption of new
regularization mechanisms in early 2020, 56% of the estimated
1.8 million Venezuelan nationals were undocumented by April
2020 (Migración Colombia, 2020). As recognized by the InterAmerican Court, undocumented migrants are often in situations
of great vulnerability, particularly when their employment is
precarious and takes place in the informal economy (InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, 2003). Some countries have
put in place some measures to avoid protracted situations of
irregularity. Ecuador extended the period to apply for a residence
permit under the regularization that had been launched in 2019
(Presidencia de la República del Ecuador, 2020). The respect for
the best interests of the child also led Ecuador to establish another
regularization procedure for parents of Ecuadorian nationals
who had entered into the country irregularly (República del
Ecuador, 2020). Similarly in Colombia, the principle of the
best interest of the child played an instrumental role in the
introduction of an exception to the normal rules for obtaining
nationality. Despite the absence of absolute ius soli in Colombia,
the new rules allowed children of Venezuelan citizens to become
Colombian nationals upon birth in the territory (Castro, 2020).
Unlike in the European Union or in the USA, detention and
expulsion are not major issues in South America (Acosta, 2018).
However, the increase in the xenophobic discourse is worrisome.
In Chile, for example, immigration debates have centered on the

South America by Panama already in 2017 (Acosta et al.,
2019).
The Venezuelan crisis has also affected regional integration.
Following tensions between Argentina and Brazil, on the one
hand, and the Venezuelan government, on the other, the
country was suspended in 2017 in its membership of the
Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) (Briceño-Ruiz,
2018). South American regionalism was further weakened when
all countries—with the exception of Guyana, Surinam, and
Venezuela—left or suspended their membership in the Union
of South American Nations (UNASUR). UNASUR was then
replaced by PROSUR 4 , a mere coordination and dialogue forum
at presidential level embodying the right-wing governments’
preferences for more fragile and less ambitious forms of
cooperation (Sanahuja, 2019). The Pacific Alliance, another
regional organization including Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and
Chile has never truly advanced on migration issues with the
exception of establishing a visa-free area among its Members.
By the end of 2019, South America was undergoing several
deep crises: an economic recession, a multidimensional crisis in
Venezuela with consequences for the whole region, and massive
protests confronting widespread social inequalities in places like
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia or Ecuador (Faúndes, 2019; Billion and
Ventura, 2020). It is within this context that COVID-19 made its
appearance in the region further affecting mobility, the economy
and the distribution of resources. At the time of writing in July
2020, South America had been severely hit by the pandemic
with Brazil having the second highest number of confirmed cases
in the world after the US, and Chile, Ecuador and Peru also
confronting major outbreaks (Horton, 2020).

COVID-19 AND HUMAN MOBILITY IN
SOUTH AMERICA
Covid-19 has arrived at a time when there was already a major
multilevel crisis of governance in South America. Its relationship
with mobility is clear at all levels. At the subnational level,
some cities in countries like Brazil or Peru that experienced a
large inflow of Venezuelans in a short period of time started
feeling pressure for the provision of public services including
health services. This has led in some instances to social tensions
and episodes of xenophobic violence (Koechlin and Eguren,
2018; Freier and Parent, 2019b). At the national level, various
governments already had low levels of public approval, which
limits their legitimacy to act in emergencies 5 . Added to this,
economic difficulties have made it harder to access international
credit and, therefore, fewer possibilities of strengthening their
health systems. Consequently, strict quarantines and lockdowns
have emerged as the main option to prevent national health
systems from collapsing. At the regional level, the weakening of
UNASUR, which was the only organization that had developed
4 Forum for the Progress and

Development of South America.
instance, after the massive protests in Chile, the approval rating of Sebastián
Piñera was below 10% [see Mella Polanco (2020)]. The management of the
COVID-19 pandemic by Bolsonaro is also weakening him and his approval ratings
are around 30% [see Belmonte Martín (2020)].

5 For
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American nationals does facilitate policy and legal responses.
However, a clearer distinction has started to emerge in some
countries between Venezuelans, on the one hand, and other
South Americans, on the other.
It is important to understand that South Americans on the
move often find themselves in transitional legal statuses. For
example, a South American might be an asylum seeker, later
obtain a residence permit as a regional citizen only to then
find himself in an irregular situation (Acosta 2018, Chapter.
7). Interestingly, despite the fact that most nationality laws
can be characterized as moderately open to naturalization in
comparative perspective—including the general acceptance of
dual citizenship everywhere except in Paraguay—the number
of those naturalizing remains very low (Acosta, 2020). In the
present circumstances, these transitions affect most dramatically
Venezuelans who represent the largest number of those moving
in the region, and will remain so for the foreseeable future.
We envisage three likely developments. First, the MERCOSUR
Residence Agreement will continue to facilitate mobility and
access to rights in the region. The Residence Agreement is one
of the main successes and longer-term policies in the history of
South American regional integration (Mondelli, 2017) because
it has proved to have institutional “lock-in” effects (Simmons,
2009; Börzel, 2016). Even in countries such as Ecuador or Peru,
where the political discourse on migration has been securitized,
its continuity is not in question. We can thus argue that COVID19 has not as of today affected the most important regional free
movement norm.
Second, recent legalizations in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador or Peru
confirm the preference by South American states in favor of
regularization as a tool to manage undocumented migration,
in cases where the MERCOSUR Residence Agreement is not
enough (e.g., because the migrants who are undocumented are
not covered under the agreement). The non-criminalization of
irregular migrants will continue to be an important element
guiding state action with detention and expulsion playing a
marginal role when compare to the EU or the USA. This is part
of a distinctive regional position in the migration agenda that
South American countries have developed in the last 12 years
and they strongly sustain in international forums, including in
the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Global Compact
on Migration (Brumat and Acosta, 2019).
Third, the economic and political consequences of the
COVID-19 crisis may emphasize existing securitization trends
in the region (Brumat et al., 2018). As the economic situation
becomes more precarious and millions of people fall below the
poverty line (ECLAC FAO, 2020), the situation of Venezuelans,
one of the most vulnerable groups of migrants, could get worse.
In Peru for instance, a new draft bill, which arrival to Congress is
pending, proposes their expulsion once their temporary permits
expired (Blouin et al., 2020). The economic consequences of
COVID-19 are presented as the rationale behind such choice
(Proyecto de Ley 5359, 25 May, 2020). Whilst its adoption
is doubtful, it is significant in how it represents a shift from
the migration bills that had been adopted and debated in the
region in the XXI century. Chile, Colombia and Ecuador are
also debating amendments of their legal frameworks. These

adoption of a new law to modify Chile’s out-dated Pinochetera immigration law from 1975. Its current President, Sebastian
Piñera, had presented his vision for Chile’s migration policy as
one that allows to “tidying up the house we share” and which
“combats irregular migration” (Prensa Presidencia, 2018). A draft
bill had remained under debate in Congress since 2018. However,
on 29 April 2020 the government requested the discussion of the
bill through an accelerated procedure despite, or rather precisely
because, it was expected that the COVID context would benefit
the adoption of a harsher final text. Also within the COVID
context, the Chilean government attempted to implement what
was labeled as a humanitarian return plan. Migrants who were
in a vulnerable situation in Chile and who availed themselves
of such plan would agree to a 9 years prohibition of entry. The
Supreme Court ruled that this was contrary to the right reside,
enter, and leave any country freely as established in Article 19 of
its Constitution and, one could add, Article 22 of the American
Convention on Human Rights (Corte Suprema de Chile, 2020).
Any measures adopted under emergency powers need to
be justified, proportional and temporary. One of the most
important restrictions in some countries—notably Argentina,
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay—relates to the right to return
to one’s own country, something that has been limited for both
nationals and permanent residents 6 . Border closures have also
limited the right to apply for asylum in various countries such as
Brazil (Brazil, Portaria 2, 20 March, 2020).
The responses to the COVID-19 crisis are intensifying a
trend that has been taking place since the mid-2010s: the
power increase of “securitist” actors (Brumat et al., 2018),
particularly the military. In order to enforce quarantines and
border closures, many countries have militarized their borders
and even cities, particularly during curfews, thus militarizing
immobility (Verdes-Montenegro, 2020).
Government responses to COVID-19 are also creating some
paradoxical consequences, such as new types of mobility. As the
economic situation worsens, many people are deciding to return
to their home countries or cities. The most extreme case of this
are Venezuelans. The UNHCR estimates that more than 50,000
people have returned to Venezuela since February 2020, despite
the need to take a risky trip back home (UNHCR, 2020). Once in
Venezuela, they have to quarantine in unhealthy conditions and
they face government persecution (Bolívar, 2020). There are also
new types of internal mobility. As many people can no longer
afford to stay in cities, many are moving back to rural areas,
for example in Peru (Chávez Yacila and Turkewitz, 2020). These
trips are usually done in buses or by foot, in ways that do not
ensure physical distance, which paradoxically increases the risk
of contagion of COVID-19.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
South America finds itself at a crossroads with important
consequences for mobility and the rights of migrants. The
fact that most migrants in the region happen to be South
6 The

measures suspending various guarantees adopted by all states can be found
at (OEA, 2020).
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amendments, if approved, would contradict and even regress
many of the human-rights-oriented policies adopted in the
early XXI century. However, we have to bear in mind that the
coexistence of “securitist” and “human rights-oriented” policy
approaches to migration characterizes regional governance in
South America (Acosta, 2018; Brumat, 2020a; Brumat et al.,
2018). The prevalence of one of the two approaches depends
on the political orientation of the governments that are in
office and the power position of various actors at domestic
level. This organic juxtaposition between restrictive and open
attitudes toward non-nationals represents a historical trend in
South America, which finds its roots in the early stages of the
construction of the new nations since the beginning of the XIX
century (Acosta, 2018).
Mobility has been at the center of the government responses
to the COVID-19 crisis in South America. These responses have
been adopted with increasingly limited resources due to the
economic, social and political constraints that the region was
already experiencing before the pandemic arrived. This, together
with the rise of governmental and non-governmental actors
whose interests are more aligned with security issues, is enforcing

changes toward restrictive migration policies and new types of
both, mobility and immobility. But at the same time, these policy
responses coexist with longer-term regional policies “locking-in”
certain rights for migrants, such as the MERCOSUR Residence
Agreement. In all the countries, the governance of migration
is not any longer a purely state affair. Numerous actors have
emerged including academics, civil society, and domestic courts.
This makes the future governance of mobility in South America
richer and more complex and a site of multilevel contestation
and accommodation.
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